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"The statute that bars persecutors has a smooth surface beneath
which lie a series of rocks. "
- Castaheda-Castillov. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 2007)

I. INTRODUCTION
A rational law, applied irrationally, can lead to unforeseen and unjust
results. In no place is this more evident than in the context of the
Refugee Act's "persecutor bar."' The persecutor bar was meant to
ensure that the world's tyrants cannot flee to the United States after they
have persecuted those in their homeland. But the bar's diction has been
interpreted to classify those who were forced to serve their own captors
and those who gave insignificant aid as "persecutors." In other words,
those who were forced at gunpoint to aid their persecutors are now
facing the possibility that they might be denied entry to the United
States because they would themselves be classified as persecutors. For
those coerced into serving their persecutors, the tragedy is complete: the
persecution they suffered also denies them protection from future
prosecution.
The U.S. Supreme Court recently granted certiorari on a case
involving whether the persecutor bar required some level of culpability,
but the Court did not decide the case on the merits. 2 Instead, the Court
remanded the case to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and
stated that it would defer to the agency's interpretation. In essence, the
Court punted on the issue3 and will await the BIA's decision. For the
time being, then, there is an open question as to whether those forced to
aid their persecutors are actually persecutors themselves.
In complying with the Supreme Court's mandate to devise a
persecutor bar rule, the BIA should not consider the issue in a vacuum.
Indeed, the issue of a statutory bar to asylum lacking a duress or de
minimis exception has recently been analyzed in another context: the
material support bar. Under the material support bar, any individual
who materially supported a terrorist was barred from asylum.4 While
facially a straightforward and necessary restriction, the material support
bar ran into problems because it did not include a de minimis or duress
1.
2.
3.
4.

Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212 (1980).
Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1162 (2009).
For a more detailed discussion of Neguise, see infra notes 34-35, 37-40.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2009); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i) (2009).
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exception. This omission led to absurd results: at least one government
official recommended that giving "a glass of water"5 to a terrorist
constituted grounds to deny asylum under the material support bar. A
number of humanitarian organizations challenged the material support
bar, and in December 2007 the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) issued new regulations allowing for an increased use of waivers
in cases of duress and de minimis material support.
This Article argues that the BIA, in solving the persecutor bar
problem assigned by the Supreme Court, should learn from the
controversy over the material support bar. Like the material support bar,
the persecutor bar is a well-intentioned restriction to exclude those
individuals who do not deserve asylum relief. Like the material support
bar, the persecutor failed to include an explicit duress or de minimis
exception. Therefore, like the material support bar, the persecutor bar
should allow for both duress and de minimis exceptions even though
there is no explicit mention of those defenses in the statute. Part II of
this Article reviews the jurisprudential history behind the persecutor
bar. Part III analyzes how Congress had to intervene to ensure that the
material support bar to asylum included duress and de minimis
exceptions. Part IV then applies the lessons from the material support
bar and argues for a duress and de minimis exception to the persecutor
bar. Part V addresses the appropriate procedure for deciding whether to
apply a duress or de minimis exception.
H1. THE SUPREME COURT PUNTS ON PERSECUTOR BAR

At its core, the issue of whether individuals who are forced to aid
their persecutors should be denied asylum depends on the interpretation
of the persecutor bar. A "refugee," under the Refugee Act of 1980,6 is
5. See T.R. Goldman, Refugees From Oppressive Regimes Kept Out, LEGAL TIMES, June
12, 2006. Walter Sanchez Arlt, the Quito-based resettlement office for the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), explained how expansively the persecutor bar was being
interpreted: "If someone provides a glass of water to a military man, 'material support.' If a
paramilitary tells you to give him a chicken, 'material support' . . . . If he says, 'Let me camp on
your farm, otherwise I'll kill you,' it's material support." Id.
6. Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 1. Refugee Act of 1980 (the Act) established
statutory recognition of political asylum in American immigration law. Congress passed the
Act to operationalize American obligations under the U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees. See generally James M. Moschella, Osorio v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service: The Second Circuit and Well-Founded Fear of Persecution Account of Political
Opinion, 21 BROOK. J.INT'L L. 471, 476 (1995). The U.S. Asylum Officer Corps stated:
The Congressional intent of the 1980 Refugee Act was to establish a
politically and geographically neutral adjudication standard for both
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defined as a displaced person who is unable or unwilling to return to
their home country "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion . . . ."

The "refugee"

definition, however, explicitly excludes those who have persecuted
others: "[t]he term 'refugee' does not include any person who ordered,
incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any
person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion." 8
The prosecutor bar was meant to ensure that war criminals and other
persecutors were not allowed to seek refuge in the United States. The
problem is that the statute does not explain whether duress or coercion
implicates an individual's status as a persecutor. The statute also does
not state whether there is a de minimis threshold of action that would
otherwise
or
assist[ing],
incit[ing],
"order[ing],
constitute
9
legislative
explicit
of
any
The
lack
participat[ing]" in persecution.
endorsement of these exceptions has resulted in a convoluted
interpretation of the persecutor bar's deceptively straightforward
language. The persecutor bar jurisprudence begins with a vague
Supreme Court opinion and continues with a split in authority as the
Courts of Appeal attempted to interpret the Supreme Court's guidance.
A. Fedorenko v. United States Muddies the Waters
For decades, the leading Supreme Court authority on the persecutor
bar came from Fedorenko v. United States,'0 a case interlTreting the
persecutor bar in the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 (DPA). 1 In short
Fedorenko held that there was no duress exception under the DPA.
The Court, however, muddied this clear mandate by including a

asylum status and refugee status, a standard to be applied equally to all
applicants regardless of their country of origin, and to abandon the
ideologically-motivated system in place before 1980.
Dessi Mathew, Claims of PoliticalAsylum Based on Non-Physical Forms of Harm Such as
Economic Sanctions andDeprivations,21 PACE INT'L L. REv. 309, 314 (2009).

7.
8.
(2009).
9.
10.
11.

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2009).
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). This prohibition also appears at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i)
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2009).
449 U.S. 490, 494 (1981).

62 Stat. 1009 (1948). Congress enacted the DPA in 1948 "to enable European
refugees driven from their homelands by the war to emigrate to the United States without regard
to traditional immigration quotas." Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 495.
12. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512.
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footnote suggesting that applicants must show a requisite level of
culpability in order to be denied asylum relief.13
In Fedorenko, the applicant was a Ukrainian national who had been
captured by the Germans shortly after he joined the Russian Army in
1941.14 The Germans forced Fedorenko to work as a guard at the
Treblinka concentration camp until 1945.'s Fedorenko applied for
admission to the United States in 1949, but lied about his activities
during the war.1 6 He was granted admission into the United States and
became an American citizen in 1970."1 However, in 1978, the U.S.
government filed an action to revoke his citizenship alleging that he had
misrepresented facts regarding his activities during the war.18 The
Southern District of Florida held that Fedorenko's citizenship should
not be revoked because he had been forced to serve as a guard
involuntarily. 19
The Supreme Court reversed the District Court, holding that "an
individual's service as a concentration camp armed guard-whether
voluntary or involuntary-made him ineligible for a visa." 2 0 The Court
based its decision on the comparison between two provisions of the
DPA.21 The DPA's bar on admission was two-fold:
[The relevant law excludes any individual] who can be shown:
(a) to have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations of
countries, Members of the United Nations; or (b) to have
voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since the outbreak of the
second world war in their operations against the United

Nations.22
The fact that the word "voluntary" appears in the second clause, but
not in the first clause, led the Court to conclude that the first clause did
not have a voluntariness requirement: "the deliberate omission of the
word 'voluntary' from § 2(a) compels the conclusion that the statute
made all those who assisted in persecution of civilians ineligible for
visas." 23
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
(1948).
23.

Id. at 514.
Id. at 490.
Id. at 493-94.
Id. at 496.
Id. at 497.
United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 897 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
Id. at 917.
Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512.
Id.
Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, Part II, § 2, 62 Stat. 3037
Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512.
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The Supreme Court, however, muddied the water by including its
cryptic footnote 34, which suggested some form of culpability was
needed in applying the DPA's persecutor bar:
The solution to the problem perceived by the District Court lies,
not in "interpreting" the Act to include a voluntariness
requirement that the statute itself does not impose, but in
focusing on whether particular conduct can be considered
assisting in the persecution of civilians. Thus, an individual who

did no more than cut the hair of female inmates before they were
executed cannot be found to have assisted in the persecution of
civilians. On the other hand, there can be no question that a guard
who was issued a uniform and armed with a rifle and a pistol,
who was paid a stipend and was regularly allowed to leave the
concentration camp to visit a nearby village, and who admitted to
shooting at escaping inmates on orders from the commandant of
the camp, fits within the statutory language about persons who
assisted in the persecution of civilians. Other cases may present
more difficult line-drawing problems but we need decide only
this case. As for the District Court's concern about the different
treatment given to visa applicants who had served in Axis combat
units who were found eligible for visas if they could show that
they had served involuntarily, this distinction was made by the
Act itself.24
The ambiguity between (1) the Court's holding that "the statute
made all those who assisted in persecution of civilians ineligible for
visas," and (2) the Court's footnote on "difficult line-drawing
problems" would ultimately lead to a Circuit split, discussed
immediately infra.

B. The CircuitsSplit: Varying Approaches to Fedorenko and the
PersecutorBar
While all Courts of Appeal applied Fedorenko's ruling on the DPA
to the Refugee Act, the courts differed on how to apply Fedorenko. The
Fifth and Second Circuits found that there was no duress exception to
the persecutor bar.2 5 The First, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, however,
24. Id. n.34 (internal citations omitted).
25. See Bah v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 348, 351 (5th Cir. 2003); Xie v. INS, 434 F.3d 136,
140 (2d Cir. 2006) (both holding that the alien's motivations for participating in the persecution
are irrelevant).
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found that duress could constitute an exception.
The Fifth Circuit has been on the forefront of a strictly textual
interpretation of the persecutor bar; indeed, both Fedorenko and
Negusie v. Holder were originally Fifth Circuit cases. 26 In the case
underlying the Supreme Court's decision in Negusie v. Holder, the Fifth
Circuit held that "[tihe question whether an alien was compelled to
assist authorities is irrelevant as is the question whether an alien shared
the authorities' intentions.", This holding accorded with the Fifth
Circuit's previous holding in Bah v. Ashcroft, where the Fifth Circuit
held:
[Applicant] seeks to avoid the plain text of the statute by arguing
that, given the fact of his forced recruitment, he did not engage in
political persecution because he did not share the RUF's intent of
political persecution. We reject this contention. The syntax of the
statute suggests that the alien's personal motivation is not
relevant.
The Fifth Circuit went on to say that Congress would have included
a duress exception if duress was meant to allow asylum: "[h]ad
Congress wanted to base the withholding of removal on the alien's
intent, it could have enacted a statute that withheld removal only of an
'alien who, because of an individual's political opinion, ordered,
incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution."' 2 9
The Second Circuit followed the Fifth Circuit's lead and held that
"neither the relevant statutes nor the case law . . . provides support for

an 'involuntariness' exception . . . ."30 While acknowledging the
statutory difference between the DPA and the Refugee Act, the Second
Circuit nevertheless held that Fedorenko was controlling:
It is true that unlike the [DPA provision], the INA does not
contain a contrasting section that covers only "voluntary"
conduct . . . [b]ut inasmuch as the INA and the DPA were
26. United States v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946 (1979). While the case took place in the
Southern District of Florida, the case predated the Circuit's bifurcation into the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits.
27. Negusie v. Gonzales, 231 Fed. Appx. 325, 325 (5th Cir. 2007).
28. Bah, 341 F.3d at 351 (finding an applicant, who had been captured by a paramilitary
group and given the option to join the paramilitary or be killed, was barred from asylum because
the applicant had joined the group was involved with various atrocities including the killing of a
female prisoner and the using machetes on civilians).
29. Id.
30. Xie, 434 F.3d at 140 (finding an applicant, who was tasked with transporting pregnant
women to hospitals to have forced abortions in accordance with China's mandatory family
planning policies, was barred from asylum because the applicant could have left his job).
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enacted for similar purposes . . . we find it unlikely that the

phrase "assisted in persecution" implicitly includes
voluntariness requirement in one statute but not the other.

a

Thus, both the Fifth and Second Circuits, relying on Fedorenko,
relied on a textual approach to find that duress was no defense to the
persecutor bar.
On the other hand, three other Courts of Appeal focused on footnote
34's "difficult line-drawing problems." 32 The Eighth Circuit reversed a
BIA's decision because it did not engage in a "particularized evaluation
in order to determine whether an individual's behavior was culpable to
such a degree that he could be fairly deemed to have assisted or
participated in persecution." 33 "[A] petitioner will not necessarily be
held responsible," the Eighth Circuit explained, "for any involvement
with a persecutory group. Rather, a court must evaluate the entire record
in order to determine whether the individual should be held personally
culpable for his conduct for purposes of §§ 101(a)(42) and
243(h)(2)(A).",34
The Ninth and First Circuits followed suit. The Ninth Circuit held
that the persecutor bar "require[d] a particularized evaluation of both
personal involvement and purposeful assistance in order to ascertain
culpability."3 5 The Ninth Circuit explained what it meant by
"particularized evaluation": "[t]his standard does not require actual
trigger-pulling, but [m]ere acquiescence or membership in an
organization, is insufficient to satisfy the persecutor exception." 36 The
First Circuit agreed with the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, but couched its
requirement for a duress exception in terms of scienter: "the term
'persecution' strongly implies both scienter and illicit motivation." 37
C. Supreme CourtHolds that Fedorenko is Not Controllingon the
Refugee Act: Negusie v. Holder
The Courts of Appeal thus offered no clear guidance on how
Fedorenko should be applied. All the Courts of Appeal found
31. Id. at 141.
32. See Castafleda-Castillo v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2007); Miranda Alvarado v.
Gonzales, 449 F.3d 915, 927 (9th Cir. 2006); Vukmirovic v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1247, 1252 (9th
Cir. 2004); Hernandez v. Reno, 258 F.3d 806, 808 (8th Cir. 2001).
33. Hernandez, 258 F.3d at 813.
34. Id. at 814.
35. MirandaAlvarado, 449 F.3d at 927; see also Vuknirovic, 362 F.3d at 1247.
36. MirandaAlvarado, 449 F.3d at 927 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
37. Castalieda-Castillo,488 F.3d at 20 ("[T]he bus driver who unwittingly ferries a killer
to the site of a massacre can hardly be labeled a 'persecutor,' even if the objective effect of his
actions was to aid the killer's secret plan.").
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Fedorenko controlling over the Refugee Act's persecutor bar, but some
Circuits focused on the fact that "the statute made all those who assisted
in persecution of civilians ineligible for visas" while others focused on
the "difficult line-drawing problems" footnote. In 2008, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to address the split in authority.
In Negusie v. Holder, the Court held that Fedorenko was not
controlling over the Refugee Act's persecutor bar because the DPA and
the Refugee Act were fundamentally different statutes:
Unlike the DPA, which was enacted to address not just the post
war refugee problem but also the Holocaust and its horror, the
Refugee Act was designed to provide a general rule for the
ongoing treatment of all refugees and displaced persons. As this
Court has twice recognized, one of Congress' primary purposes
in passing the Refugee Act was to implement the principles
agreed to in the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, as well as the United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees. These authorities illustrate
why Fedorenko, which addressed a different statute enacted for a
different purpose, does not control the BIA's interpretation of this
persecutor bar. 38
After distinguishing Fedorenko, the Court declined to decide the
issue of whether the persecutor bar should include a duress exception.
Rather, the majority opinion held that the issue of whether the statute
implies a duress exception is an issue of "ambiguous statutory terms"
that warranted the exercise of administrative expertise.3 9 Consequently,
the Court remanded the case to the BIA with the instruction that
whatever the BIA decided would be treated with Chevron deference.40
38. Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1165-66 (2009) (quoting INS v Aguirre-Aguirre,
526 U.S. 415, 427 (1999); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987)).
39. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1167. The Court stated:
Our reading of these decisions confirms that the BIA has not exercised its
interpretive authority but, instead, has determined that Fedorenko controls.
This mistaken assumption stems from a failure to recognize the
inapplicability of the principle of statutory construction invoked in
Fedorenko, as well as a failure to appreciate the differences in statutory
purpose. The BIA is not bound to apply the Fedorenko rule that motive and
intent are irrelevant to the persecutor bar at issue in this case. Whether the
statute permits such an interpretation based on a different course of
reasoning must be determined in the first instance by the agency.
Id.
40. Id. at 1163. Under Chevron US.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
administrative agencies are entitled to deference in interpreting ambiguous provisions in their
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In his partial dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the Court should
have affirmatively held that the persecutor bar includes a duress
exception. 4 1 He posited that the Court should rule on "pure question[s]
of statutory construction" while granting administrative agencies
deference in fact-intensive questions. Stevens then stated that the issue
of a duress exception is one of those "narrow legal question[s]" of
statutory interpretation that the Court should answer before
remanding.43 He concludes by advocating for a duress exception:
Without an exception for involuntary action, the Refugee Act's
bar would similarly treat entire classes of victims as persecutors.
The Act does not support such a reading. The language of the
persecutor bar is most naturally read to denote culpable conduct,
and this reading is powerfully supported by the statutory context
and legislative history."
The Supreme Court, given the opportunity to decide what was meant
by Congress's persecutor bar, opted instead to punt the issue to the BIA.
The functional result of Negusie, then, is that the BIA must now decide
how to interpret the persecutor bar.

III. A USEFUL EXAMPLE: THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY'S RESPONSE TO THE MECHANICAL APPLICATION OF THE

MATERIAL SUPPORT BAR
In deciding how to proceed, the BIA should not fall prey to a
simplistic, "mechanical" interpretation of the persecutor bar that
consists of nothing more than looking at the absence of an explicit
duress or de minimis exception and then devising a blanket rule
forbidding the use of those exceptions. Instead, the BIA should examine
the persecutor bar in context; in particular, the BIA. would be well
served to apply the lessons from the material support bar.
A. The MaterialSupport Bar's Lack ofDe Minimis and
DuressExceptions
The material support bar denied admission to those who supported
areas of expertise. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 84243 (1984).
41. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1170.
42. Id. at 1173; compare Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 448-49 (overturning the BIA's
adjudication), with Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 433 (giving the BIA deference).
43. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1173.
44. Id. at 174.
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terrorists.4 5 While ostensibly a reasonable law, the material support
bar's real difficulties began when the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and
the REAL ID Act of 200547 expanded the scope of the bar. Under the
new provisions, "material support" included "a safe house,
transportation, communications, funds, transfer of funds or other
material financial benefit, false documentation or identification,
weapons (including chemical, biological, or radiological weapons),
explosives, or training. 4 8
The material bar was not found to encompass a duress defense. In
Arias v. Gonzales, the Court of Appeals found that a farmer's payment
of a vacuna, or a bribe demanded by a narcoterrorist under threat of
violent force, constituted material support to a terrorist organization.4 9
The court made this decision despite the fact that ten armed FARC
guerrillas had come to the applicant's farm and despite the fact that the
applicant was afraid he would be killed if he did not pay the FARC.50 In
the asylum case In the Matter of R.K, the Immigration Judge found that
the material support bar prohibited admission of an applicant who after
being kidnapped, paid his captors a ransom to be released. 1 The
Immigration Judge found that the 50,000 rupee ransom constituted
material support, and the applicant was denied.s
The courts also broadly interpreted "material support" and found that
there was no de minimis exception. For example, in Singh-Kaur v.
Ashcroft, the Court of Appeals found that an applicant who had
provided food and set up tents of a religious congregation was barred
from asylum because the congregation may have included members of
the religion's militant sect. 53 The court did not address the magnitude of
the applicant's support, but instead focused only on "whether the type of
activity in which Singh engaged comes within the statutory definition of
'material support' as a matter of law." 54 The DHS similarly advocated
an expansive definition of the material support bar, arguing that
"material support" should be interpreted as including any support, no
45. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (2005).
46.
Intercept
Stat. 272,
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
and Obstruct Terrorism ("USA PATRIOT") Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
§ 411(a) (2001).
REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13 (2005).
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (2005).
Arias v. Gonzales, 143 Fed. Appx. 464, 468 (3d Cir. 2005).
Id. at 466.
See Susan Benesch & Devon Chaffee, The Ever-Expanding Material Support Bar, 83

INTERPRETER RELEASES 11, Mar. 13, 2006, at 468 (2006) (describing the In the Matter of R.K

opinion).
52. Id.
53. Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 293, 297-98 (3d Cir. 2004).
54. Id. at 298; see also Benesch & Chaffee, supra note 51, at 468.
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matter how insignificant.55 In other words, the prevailing opinion was
that the court should read the "material" out of "material support"
standard.16
In sum, the material support bar did not include explicit duress or de
minimis exceptions, and courts were rigidly applying the bar against
aliens who had been coerced into compliance or had given trivial
assistance. The bar that had been strengthened as an attempt to stop
terrorists had instead resulted in an increased burden on the terrorists'
victims.
B. Public Criticism of the MaterialSupport Bar's
Expansive Interpretation
In response to material bar amendments in the USA PATRIOT Act
and the REAL ID Act, a number of humanitarian law professionals
began to publicly criticize the heavy-handed use of the material support
bar.5 One of the most comprehensive of these humanitarian efforts was
the Georgetown University Law Center's Human Rights Institute
Refugee Fact-Finding Investigation White Paper in May 2006.58 The
Georgetown Law Study, following the methodology of a previous
Harvard Law School study of Burmese asylum seekers,5 9 interviewed a
number of Colombian asylum seekers to determine how the material
support bar was being applied. 60 It sum, the Georgetown Law Study
55.

See HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, UNINTENDED

CONSEQUENCES: REFUGEE VICTIMS OF THE WAR ON TERROR 10-11 (Mark Fleming et al. eds.,

2006) [hereinafter Georgetown Law Study]. The Georgetown Law study is the seminal work on
the material support bar. In discussing the DHS's position on the material support bar, the
Georgetown Law study cites both oral arguments before Immigration Judges and the DHS brief
in Arias v. Gonzales, 143 Fed. Appx. 464 (2005).
56. Singh-Kaur, 385 F.3d at 303 (Fisher, dissenting).
I conclude that Congress did not intend "material support" to embrace acts
that are not of importance or relevance to terrorism. To hold otherwise reads
'material' out of 'material support' and treats half of the statutory term as
surplusage. Such a result is inconsistent with the plain language of the
statute and with the normal tools of statutory construction.
Id.
57.
58.

See, e.g., Benesch & Chaffee, supranote 51, at 465-66.
See Georgetown Law Study, supra note 55, at 1-2.

59.

THE IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE CLINIC & TiE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW SCHOOL, PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND

CLINIC, HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAM, HARVARD

CONCLUSIONS ON THE MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM BAR AS APPLIED TO THE OVERSEAS

RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES FROM BURMA 3 (Harvard Law School 2006), available at http://

www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/06619-asy-mat-sup-terr-bar-study.pdf
Study].
60. See Georgetown Law Study, supra note 55, at 16-21.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol22/iss2/3

[hereinafter Harvard Law

12

Walsh: Navigating the "Series of Rocks": Applying the Lessons from the M

2010]

NAVIGATING THE "SERIES OF ROCKS": APPLYING THE LESSONS

239

found that the material support bar was effectively keeping out bona
fide asylum seekers based on minimal, inconsequential aid demanded
by the FARC.
Three anecdotal stories discussed in the Georgetown Law Study are
illustrative of the absurd consequences of mechanically applying the
material support bar. First, there was the case of a Liberian woman who
was attacked by rebels from the Liberians United for Reconciliation and
Democracy (LURD). 62 The LURD killed the woman's father, abducted
the woman, gang-raped her, and held her against her will. 63 The "DHS
deferred her case on material support grounds," claiming "she [had]
provided material support while she was [being] held hostage" by
"washing the rebels' clothing." 64 Second, a Colombian woman operated
a restaurant frequented by FARC members. 65 Even though
paramilitaries brutally killed the woman's brother and burned down her
restaurant, the Colombian woman would be barred from asylum under a
mechanical application of the material support bar because the woman
had served FARC members in her restaurant. 66 Third, a Colombian man
detailed how the FARC had kidnapped him, chained him up for fortyfive days, and demanded that the man give the FARC his motorcycle
and supplies. 67 Under a mechanical application of the material support
bar, the Colombian man would be barred from asylum because he gave
his motorcycle to the FARC.6
These stories, and other like them, 9 showcase the practical results of
failing to use "common sense"70 in applying the material support bar.
The three individuals discussed immediately supra were not the type of
people meant to be excluded by the USA PATRIOT Act and the REAL
ID Act; these three individuals are guilty of nothing more than falling
61. See id. at 18. The FARC, originally a Marxist revolutionary group in the 1950s, has
morphed into one of the world's largest narcoterrorist organizations. Colombia's "war with the
FARC has claimed the lives of more than 250,000 Colombians and has forcibly displaced more
than 1,350,000." See Frank M. Walsh, Rethinking the Legality of Colombia's Attack on the
FARC in Ecuador: A New Paradigmfor Balancing TerritorialIntegrity, Self-Defense and the
Duties ofSovereignty, 21 PACE INT'L L. REv. 137, 140-41, 143 (2009).
62. Georgetown Law Study, supra note 55, at 11.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 21.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 19.
68. Id.
69. For more examples of the perverse consequences of the material support bar's lack of
a de minimis and duress exceptions, see Harvard Law Study, supra note 59; ELEANOR ACER ET
AL., ABANDONING THE PERSECUTOR: VICTIMS OF TERRORISM AND OPPRESSION BARRED FROM

ASYLUM (Human Rights First 2006), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/06925asy-abandon-persecuted.pdf.
70. Castafieda-Castillo v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 17, 20, 21 (1st Cir. 2007).
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prey to the very terrorists American law is supposed to target. These
kinds of anecdotal stories highlighted the sheer absurdity of
mechanically applying the material support bar, and the story soon
gained traction with the mainstream media.7 ' The humanitarian critique
of the material support bar was thus straightforward: in attempting to
stop terrorists' funding, Congress had inadvertently forged an unwieldy
shield that was keeping out bona fide refugees who deserved protection.
C. Congress PassesAmendments to Increase the Use of Waiversfor
Duress and De Minimis When Considering Whether the Material
Support Bar Applies
Following the public criticism of the material support bar, Congress
amended 8 U.S.C. § 1182 to expand the use of discretionary waivers to
72
the terrorism-related bars. This resulted in Department of Homeland
Security Secretary Michael Chertoff issuing a pair of exercises of
discretion. First, on February 26, 2007, Secretary Chertoff announced
that the material support bar would not apply to lower-level (Tier II)7 3
organizations. Second, on April 27, 2007, Secretary Chertoff opened up
the exercise of discretion to designated terrorist groups (Tiers I and II)
and announced that the material support bar "shall not apply to certain
individuals who have provided material support under duress to certain
terrorist organizations." 74 In a Fact Sheet issued subsequent to Secretary
Chertoff's April 27 exercise of discretion, the U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) explained that "USCIS, in its discretion,
will evaluate whether the material support provided to a designated
terrorist organization was provided under duress and whether the
totality of75 the circumstances warrants a favorable exercise of
authority." .
71. See, e.g., Editorial, Real Injustice, Editorial, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2006; Editorial,
Terroristsof Victims, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2006.
72. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844, 236465 (2007) ("The Secretary of State, after consultation with the Attorney General and the
Secretary of Homeland Security, or the Secretary of Homeland Security, after consultation with
the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, may determine in such Secretary's sole
unreviewable discretion that subsection (a)(3)(B) shall not apply with respect to an alien within
the scope of that subsection . . . ").
73. OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS, U.S. CIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, FACT
SHEET CONCERNING THE SECRETARY'S EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY UNDER SEC. 212(d)(3)(B)(i) 1
(U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 2007) [hereinafter Fact Sheet]. A "Tier III" group is
one that has not been listed or designated on as a "terrorist organization" through any public
process, but is considered to be a "terrorist organization" for the purposes of the INA because it
"is a group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which engages in, or has a
subgroup that engages in .. . terrorist activity." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii-iv) (2009).
74. 8 U.S.C. § 11 82(a)(3)(B)(iii-iv) (2009).
75. Fact Sheet, supra note 73, at 1.
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Under the expanded use of waivers, Immigration Judges did not
have the power to grant asylum on their own.7 6 Rather, the
Immigrations Judges could place the duress cases on hold while the
USCIS devised a way to administer material support cases. This
cumbersome approach resulted in long processing delays and
bureaucratic inefficiencies. 7 8 Currently, USCIS requires "two levels of
supervisory review for all duress-based material support exemptions." 79
Additionally, USCIS has stood up a Material Support Working Group to
standardize the material support duress exceptions agency-wide.80
The waiver process thus ostensibly gave asylum applicants the
ability to avoid the material support bar's draconian prophylactic
consequences. In this way, it offers at least a theoretical avenue for
relief. On the other hand, the exercise of discretion was only a partial
solution because it did not absolve aliens of persecutor status but merely
allowed the Secretary of Homeland Security to waive removal.8 1 The
waiver mechanism, requiring two levels of supervisory approval, meant
that those best qualified to make a factual determination of culpability,
the Immigration Judges, are denied the ability to carry out their
responsibilities. 82 In short, the expanded waiver process is better than
the status quo, but it also leaves much to be desired.
IV. APPLYING THE LESSONS FROM THE MATERIAL SUPPORT BAR:
AVOIDING A MECHANICAL APPLICATION OF THE PERSECUTOR BAR
The BIA should learn from the material support bar story and
improve upon the imperfect solution to that problem by recognizing
duress and de minimis exceptions.
A. The BIA Should Recognize a Duress Exception
Given the Supreme Court's open mandate in Negusie to have the
BIA craft its own rule without the limitations of Fedorenko and its
progeny, the BIA will be acting relatively free of precedential

76. Id.
77. See Darryl Fears, US. Anti-Terrorism Laws Hold up Asylum Seekers, WASH. POST,
Aug. 13, 2007; Anwen Hughes, DoubleJeopardy, PIrrSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 15, 2007.
78. See Fears,supra note 77; Hughes, supra note 77.
79. MICHAEL AYTES, MEMORANDUM TO FIELD LEADERSHIP 1 (U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services 2009), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/terrorrelatedinadmissibility_1 3febO9.pdf.
80. Id.
81. Id.; see Fears,supra note 77; Hughes, supra note 77.
82. See AYTES, supra note 79, at 1.
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restrictions.8 3 With that in mind, the BIA should focus on crafting a
persecutor bar that best advances the goals of the Refugee Act and the
Immigration and Naturalization Act. Indeed, that is exactly the basis
behind the judiciary's deference to the administrative agencies: the
administrative agencies are assumed to have the best institutional
competence to execute the law in their respective areas of expertise. 84
Consequently, the BIA should recognize a duress exception to the
persecutor bar because such an exception is in the interest of both sound
policy and sound legal interpretation.
A duress exception is good policy because, in addition to meeting
the "common sense" test,8 interpreting the persecutor bar to include an
involuntary support exception for those who aided persecutors under
duress accords American immigration law with the harsh realities of the
modem world. Persecutors do not simply pressure their victims; rather,
persecutors often force others to aid in the persecutory enterprise.86 Just
as a duress exception to the material support bar was sound policy
because such an exception allowed Immigration Judges to differentiate
between the financial sponsors of terrorism and the victims of terrorist
coercion, so too does a duress defense to the persecutor bar make sound
policy because such an exception would allow Immigration Judges to
differentiate between those who persecute others and those who are
forced to serve their captors.
A duress exception also has a sound legal basis. As the Supreme
Court stated in Negusie, the BIA is uniquely competent to determine the
contours of the persecutor bar:
The agency's interpretation of the statutory meaning of
"persecution" may be explained by a more comprehensive
definition, one designed to elaborate on the term in anticipation
of a wide range of potential conduct; and that expanded definition
in turn may be influenced by how practical, or impractical, the
standard would be in terms of its application to specific cases.

83. Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1167-68 (2009). "It is to agency officials, not to
the Members of this Court, that Congress has given discretion to choose among permissible
interpretations of the statute. They deserve to be told clearly whether we are serious about
allowing them to exercise that discretion, or are rather firing a warning shot across the bow. Id
at 1170 (J. Scalia concurring).
84. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) (explaining administrative deference).
85. Castafteda-Castillo v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 2007).
86. For an anecdotal discussion of the types of individuals who would unjustly be denied
asylum if the BIA endorsed a mechanical interpretation, see Amicus Brief, Human Rights First,
Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009).
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These matters may have relevance in determining whether its
statutory interpretation is a permissible one.87
The BIA is thus expressly allowed to consider questions of policy in
determining the scope of prohibited "persecution." In dealing with the
issues inherent in anticipating a "wide range of potential conduct," the
BIA would be well served to incorporate the lessons learned from the
material support bar. Just as Congress had not meant to mechanically
exclude those who were coerced into aiding terrorists, Congress likely
did not intend to exclude victims of persecution who had been forced to
aid their persecutors.
A duress exception would not sanction the "just following orders"
defense to human rights abuses. As the case law in the Eighth, Ninth,
and First Circuit has shown, the duress exception is a scalpel that allows
Immigration Judges to isolate bona fide asylum-seekers from those who
made the despicable choice to persecute others. Recognizing a duress
exception would not throw open the flood gates for the world's
persecutors; the Courts of Appeal that have applied a duress exception
have shown that numerous lower-level accomplices in a persecutory
enterprise could not make a showing of duress and were denied asylum.
For example, in Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzales,8 9 the Ninth Circuit
applied a duress exception but nevertheless found that a persecutor's
interpreter inadmissible under the persecutor bar because there was no
evidence that "dire physical consequences-as distinct from economic
and career consequences-would have resulted from simply refusing to
continue [working for the persecutors]."90 While the details of how a

duress exception would be applied are wholly within the province of the
BIA, the relevant point is that a duress exception would not undermine
the central purpose of the persecutor bar: denying bona fide persecutors
the benefit of American immigration law.

87. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1168.
88. Some commentators argue that the "on account of' clause in the persecutor bar was
meant to modify "ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated" instead of "persecution."
See, e.g., Overcoming the PersecutorBar: Applying a Purposeful Mens Rea Requirement to 8
U.S.C. § 1101(A)(42), 32 HAMLINE L.REv. 571, 604 (2009) ("Thus, an applicant for asylum who
did not have the conscious object to engage in persecution is one who did not have the
conscious objective to threaten the life or freedom of his or her victim because of the victim's
membership in a protected class."); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006) (barring those who
"ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.").
This approach, however, does not accord with the definition of "refugee," where an identical
"on account of" phrase clearly modifies the term "persecution." 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42) (2006).
89. 449 F.3d 915, 929 (9th Cir. 2006).
90. Id. at 929.
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Aliens seeking to use the duress exception simply do not constitute
the type of threat imagined when the law was drafted. Individuals
seeking to rely on the duress exception would have had to already
shown that they themselves had been the victims of persecution "on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion." 9 1 The men and women who have been
brutally forced to follow the dictates of persecutors are exactly the type
of people the Refugee Act was meant to protect. Embracing a duress
exception would align the persecutor bar with the overall scope of the
Refugee Act.
B. The BIA Should Recognize a De Minimis Exception
The second component of the BIA's response to Negusie should be
to recognize a de minimis exception. It is in this context that BIA action
is most clear; failing to acknowledge a de minimis exception would lead
to the type of absurd results that typify unreasonable applications of
reasonable laws.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the de minimis doctrine
applies to all laws unless that law explicitly disaffirms a de minimis
clause:
The venerable maxim de minimis non curat lex ('the law cares
not for trifles') is part of the established background of legal
principles against which all enactments are adopted, and which
all enactments (absent contrary indication) are deemed to accept
. . . . Whether a particular activity is a de minimis deviation from
a prescribed standard must ... be determined with reference to

the purpose of the standard.9 2
Thus, because the persecutor bar does not contain an explicit
provision precluding the application of de minimis principles, the de
minimis doctrine should be considered when deciding whether an

91. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006).
92. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr. Co., 505 U.S. 214, 231-32
(1992). See also Abbott Labs. v. Portland Retail Druggists, 425 U.S. 1, 18 (1976) (occasional
emergency dispensation of drugs to walk-in patients is de minimis deviation from RobinsonPatman Act's exemption for hospitals' purchase of supplies "for their own use"); Anderson v.
Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946) (discussing de minimis activities under the Fair
Labor Standards Act); Indus. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 64, 68 (1925) (holding that three
or four "sporadic and doubtful instances" of interference with interstate commerce was
insufficient to establish a violation of the Sherman Act).
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alien's alleged actions rise to the level of "ordering], incit[ing],
assist[ing], or otherwise participat[ing]" in persecution.
When applying the de minimis principle, the Supreme Court has
instructed the courts to look to the "the purpose of the standard"
underlying the law. 94 The persecutor bar is part of a statute meant to
protect the world's most vulnerable. Indeed, the Court has
acknowledged the Refugee Act's role in global humanitarian law's
attempt to protect displaced aliens: "[i]f one thing is clear from the
legislative history of the new definition of 'refugee,' and indeed the
entire 1980 Act, it is that one of Congress' primary purposes was to
bring United States refugee law into conformance with the 1967 United
Nations Protocol." 95 The relevant 1967 United Nations Protocol 96
suggests reading statutory restrictions narrowly so as to widen aliens'
exercise of asylum relief: "the United Nations has, on various
occasions, manifested its profound concern for refugees and endeavored
to assure refugees the widest possible exercise of these fundamental
rights and freedoms." 97 Thus, the de minimis exception should be
applied to American immigration law in a way that "assure[s] refugees
the widest possible exercise" of their rights. 98
Aliens seeking to use the de minimis exception are not the type of
people targeted by the persecutor bar. Like those relying on the duress
exception, individuals attempting to rely on the de minims exception
would have had to already shown that they themselves had been the
victims of persecution "on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." 99 To
acknowledge that an alien was the victim of persecution but then deny
that alien asylum because of token assistance to actual persecutors
would epitomize the irrational application of a rational law.

93.
94.
95.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006).
Wrigley, 505 U.S. at 232.
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 437 (1987) (internal citations omitted).

96.

UNITED NATIONS PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, Jan. 31, 1967,

268 U.N.T.S. 8791. Signatories of the Refugee Protocol, which the United States signed in
1968, incorporated the terms of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.
Id. art. 1(1) ("The States Parties to the present Protocol undertake to apply articles 2 to 34
inclusive of the Convention to refugees as hereinafter defined.").
97. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Preamble, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T.
6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
98. Id.

99. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006).
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V. IMPROVING ON THE MATERIAL SUPPORT BAR'S SOLUTION: THE

BIA

SHOULD ALLOW IMMIGRATION JUDGES TO APPLY THE DURESS
AND DE MINIMIS EXCEPTIONS BECAUSE THIS INCENTIVIZES
BETTER ADJUDICATION

In crafting its persecutor bar policy, the BIA should improve upon
the solution devised for the material support bar. The second lesson
from the material support bar context was procedural in nature; using
the Secretary of Homeland Security's waiver authority to ensure the
reasonable administration of the material support bar resulted in a host
of bureaucratic inefficiencies. In ensuring the reasonableness of the
persecutor bar, the BIA should also ensure that the process is designed
to advance efficiency and accuracy. In fact, the Supreme Court
explicitly endorsed practicality as a valid consideration when fashioning
the persecutor bar standard: "[tihe . . . expanded definition in turn may

be influenced by how practical,or impractical,the standard would be
in terms of its application to specific cases."' 00
The most efficient and effective way to adjudicate whether an
asylum applicant had acted under duress or whose actions were de
minimis would be to place the decision-making authority with
Immigration Judges. Because the "opportunity to judge the demeanor of
a witness face-to-face is accorded great value in our tradition"o'0 and
because judges can detect nuanced, nonverbal indicators that are not
part of the written record, American jurisprudence accords trial courts
great deference in weighing the credibility of a witness. 102 As the
Supreme Court explained in United States v. Raddatz, the face-to-face
interaction between a trier of fact and the witness yields special insight
into the testimony:
The principle that deference must be paid to the findings of the
official who hears the testimony is reflected in a wide variety of
areas of the law. Under Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a trial court's factual findings may be reversed only
when "clearly erroneous," a standard that reflects the common
understanding that [because of the face] to face with living
witnesses the original trier of the facts holds a position of
advantage from which appellate judges are excluded. In doubtful
cases the exercise of his power of observation often proves the
most accurate method of ascertaining the truth.103

100.
101.
102.
103.

Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1168 (2009) (emphasis added).
Thornton v. Snyder, 428 F.3d 690, 698 n.2 (7th Cir. 2005).
See United States v. Oregon Med. Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 339 (1952).
United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 697 n.3 (1980) (citations omitted).
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Other courts have echoed the unique vantage point of those who
heard testimony in person, arguing that the trier of fact "sees and hears
the witnesses at first hand and comes to appreciate the nuances of the

litigation." 104
The REAL ID Act itself recognizes the Immigration Judges' unique
insight on factual determinations, 0 5 giving the Immigration Judge
almost unreviewable power in deciding whether an applicant's
testimony was credible. 6 With REAL ID, Congress seemed to echo the
traditional jurisprudential idea that an in-court observer was best
situated to make credibility determinations about testimony. The
legislative history of REAL ID shows that an Immigration Judge's
ability to rely on the intangible aspects of an applicant's testimony was
exactly why Congress granted such wide latitude to the Judge: "[ain
immigration judge alone is in a position to observe an alien's tone and
demeanor, to explore inconsistencies in testimony ... [h]e is, by virtue
of his acquired skill, uniquely qualified to decide whether an alien's
testimony has about it the ring of truth." 107
The fact-intensive decision of whether an alien acted under duress or
whether an alien gave de minimis aid should therefore lie with the
Immigration Judge and not with hierarchal DHS panels. Immigration
Judges are uniquely situated to adjudicate based on the nuanced data
that is critical in duress and de minimis decisions. If the BIA follows the
material support bar's cumbersome waiver process, then the BIA would
be endorsing a less efficient method that is less likely to accurately
decide who should benefit from asylum relief. 08
104. Thornton, 428 F.3d at 698 n.2 ("The importance of presenting live testimony in court
cannot be forgotten.").
105. See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on
Terror, and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13 (2005).
106. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D) (2006) ("No court shall reverse a determination made
by a trier of fact with respect to the availability of corroborating evidence . . . unless the court
finds . . . that a reasonable trier of fact is compelled to conclude that such corroborating
evidence is unavailable."); see also Aubra Fletcher, The REAL ID Act: Furthering Gender Bias
in US. Asylum Law, 21 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 111, 126 (2006) ("Finally, the 'trier of

fact' language in this section may lead the BIA and federal courts to defer to IJ findings in this
regard.").
107. H.R. REP. No. 109-72, at 167 (2005) (Conf. Rep.) (quoting Sarvia-Quintanilla v. INS,
767 F.2d 1387, 1395 (9th Cir. 1985)).
108. There is a statistically significant difference in the asylum grant rates between
Immigration Judges who conduct their hearings via video teleconferencing (VTC) and those
who conduct their hearings in person. See Frank M. Walsh & Edward M. Walsh, Effective
Processing or Assembly-Line Justice?: The Use of Teleconferencing in Asylum Removal
Hearings, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 259 (2008) (arguing that the use of VTC alters adjudication
because the use of VTC removes the adjudicator's ability to perceive subtle, nuanced clues).
The adjudication by DHS boards would likely be even more different from in-person
adjudications than the VTC adjudications because reviewing the written record is even more
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VI. CONCLUSION

In his Negusie v. Holder concurrence, Justice Scalia argued that
immigration law is distinct from criminal law in that immigration law
concerns itself with the "desirability" of an alien.' 09 In other words,
immigration law is about more than just punishing wrongdoers;I 0 it is
about building our desired vision of America by incorporating those
who we want to be "Americans." The refugees who have fled their
countries and established that they have been persecuted constitute a
rich population of candidates for citizenship. By mechanically applying
the persecutor bar, the BIA would effectively refuse to consider all
those whose home government's persecution was particularly severe. A
better approach would be to recognize that individualized analyses of
duress and de minimis contributions would allow Immigration Judges to
cull the victims from the bona fide persecutors.
The BIA now has the opportunity to build upon immigration law's
experiences with the material support bar; the BIA can take the good
and improve upon the bad. This Article has arued that the BIA should
out of some perverse
refrain from subjugating its "common sense"
adherence to the letter of the law over its spirit. Asylum applicants
already face a difficult task in meeting their prima facie burden, and the
vast majority of applicants do not obtain asylum relief.11 2 Those few
who can manage to establish a well-founded fear of persecution should
not be denied relief because they gave immaterial aid or because they
had to choose between death or cooperation.
The First Circuit, in describing the persecutor bar, called it a "series
of rocks" because the bar was deceptively complex.11 3 The BIA now
bears the burden of navigating that "series of rocks," but it does not sail
in uncharted waters. Rather, the lessons from the material support bar
guide its course: (1) duress and de minimis exceptions should be
recognized, and (2) the decision to apply these exceptions should be
made by the Immigration Judge. By applying the material support bar's
lessons, the BIA can answer the Supreme Court's Negusie mandate in a
removed than a VTC system. Judges not only lose nuances of testimony by watching it on a
screen; DHS boards would lose all visual and all auditory indicators.
109. Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1169 (2009).
110. The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that immigration law is not criminal in
nature. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 729-30 (1893).
111. Castafieda-Castillo v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 2007).
112. See Walsh & Walsh, supra note 108, at 280. In 2005, out of 59,833 asylum
applicants, 18,650 aliens were denied asylum, 13,192 aliens withdrew their cases, and 3,583
aliens abandoned their cases. Only 11,758 aliens won asylum in 2005. Similarly, in 2006, only
13,356 aliens won asylum while 16,123 aliens were denied asylum, 10,082 withdrew their
claims, and 3,858 aliens abandoned their claims.
113. Castaileda-Castillo,488 F.3d at 20.
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way that both shelters the world's most vulnerable and protects the
United States against the world's most dangerous.
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